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War Without End? Legal
Wrangling Without End
Jeremy Rabkin *
It is optimistic to argue, as Jack Goldsmith does, that
debates in the Bush era generated a broad consensus on
national security law in later years. Rather, partisan critics
denounced a Republican administration for violating the law,
then acquiesced to similar practices when implemented under its
Democratic successors. But politics won’t disappear from
national security law, because citizens demand security as well
as law. Political leaders will only embrace fixed rules when they
accommodate exceptions. We will continue to have debates over
the exceptions. Even the original expounders of modern natural
law expected this result.
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Jack Goldsmith’s book, Power and Constraint, 1 is a genuine
contribution to the history of our time. It offers a wealth of detail,
reflecting energetic and fair-minded inquiry. I believe its underlying
interpretation of events, however, is somewhat optimistic.
In Goldsmith’s account, the debates of the Bush years achieved
reform of some policies. For other polices, such debates established a
more firmly grounded consensus, ultimately embraced by the Obama
Administration. In Goldsmith’s view, this shows that we have a
system that will restrain impulsive presidential action. I accept every
detail of Goldsmith’s account, but I remain skeptical of his “relatively
sanguine” conclusion. 2
I don’t say this as someone determined to counter the positions
advanced by Professor Goldsmith. A few years ago, Goldsmith
published (with Darryl Levinson) Law for States, in the Harvard Law
*

George Mason University School of Law.

1.

JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).

2.

Id. at 248.
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Review, 3 expressing general skepticism about such law, noting parallel
difficulties in international law and American constitutional law. I
think the skeptical Goldsmith of that article offers a better
perspective on recent disputes about national security law than the
optimistic account on offer in Power and Constraint.

I.

Questionable Consensus

As Goldsmith tells the story in his book, we had fierce debates
about Guantanamo detention policies, about trial by military
commissions, and about coercive interrogation practices in President
George W. Bush’s first term. Reforms were introduced into detention
policy and into military trial procedures; a blanket ban was imposed
on “torture.” The most sensible or consensual compromises of the
Bush era prevailed after they were “vetted, altered and blessed—with
restrictions and accountability strings attached—by other branches of
the U.S. government.” 4 In short, the system worked.
I see the larger pattern differently. I am struck not by continuity
but contrast. Partisan critics of the Bush Administration wielded
legalist critiques when it was helpful in discrediting Bush policies.
They then forgot their scruples when the White House was occupied
by a president who was more to their liking (at least in general). That
left the Obama Administration free to disregard legal constraints on
the executive and to disregard even the policy compromises
supposedly settled by the previous debates.
Start with the issue of detention. The Obama Administration
came to office promising to close the detention facilities at
Guantanamo. It is true (as Goldsmith records) that congressional
opposition forced the new administration to abandon plans to move
Guantanamo detainees to U.S. prisons and arrange for civilian trials
of detainees in the United States. 5 But the Obama Administration
was not willing to develop a new policy to determine when newly
captured terror suspects could be brought to Guantanamo. Perhaps it
was unwilling to offend the political constituency that still expected
Obama to close down Guantanamo and so did not want to be seen
expanding rather than diminishing the number of detainees there. It
did not embrace Goldsmith’s confident conclusion that
Guantanamo—now that “torture” had been outlawed and some form
of habeas jurisdiction extended there—had been “vetted” and
“blessed” as a suitable place to bring suspects for long-term detention
and continuing interrogation.
3.

Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009).

4.

GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at xii–xiii.

5.

Id. at 11–12.
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Instead, the Obama Administration stepped up drone strikes on
terrorist suspects, as if killing terrorists were always preferable to
capturing, detaining, and interrogating them. 6 One might think
targeted killings would have raised troubling legal questions.
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration has received far less criticism
for drone strikes than the Bush Administration did for its detention
and interrogation practices.
The Obama Administration received so little criticism that it was
emboldened to extend the reach of its drone campaign to seemingly
peripheral targets. The most notable of these was Anwar al-Awlaki, a
Muslim imam, accused of providing “motivational” videos inspiring
viewers to engage in terrorism. 7 Al-Awlaki was, in fact, a U.S. citizen,
educated at American universities. 8 He was alleged to have
encouraged potential recruits to participate in terrorist operations,
but his own direct role in terrorist operations remained sketchy (at
least in public accounts). 9 One might say his videos were clerical
malpractice, but they probably would not be regarded as criminal
offenses in the United States. Capital punishment seems a rather
extreme penalty in the circumstances.
The Obama Administration assured critics that it would not
undertake targeted killings except after careful review, a review
conducted entirely within the executive branch, in secret, without
participation by the intended target, without any opportunity for
administrative appeal, let alone appeal to the ordinary courts. 10 One
6.

For one of the rare acknowledgments that drone strikes would deprive
the United States of valuable intelligence that might be gained by
capture and interrogation, see Marisa Porges, Dead Men Share No
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
09/25/opinion/dont-kill-every-terrorist.html?_r=0.

7.

Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, From Condemning Terror to
Teaching Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1.

8.

Id.

9.

See David Ignatius, The Killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi: The White House’s
Drone Attack Policy, WASH. POST, POST PARTISAN BLOG (Sept. 30,
2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan
/post/the-killing-of-anwar-al-aulaqi-the-white-houses-drone-attack-policy
/2011/09/30/gIQAT3HAAL_blog.html (citing characterizations of alAwlaki as “chief of external operations” for an al-Qaeda group in
Yemen).

10.

An overview of the administration’s procedures and legal arguments was
not provided in a formal document but in a speech by Attorney General
Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law. Eric Holder,
Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern University School of
Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/
speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
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might think this “procedure” would raise more concerns than
anything attempted at Guantanamo. In fact, it provoked very little
public debate.
Meanwhile, President Obama repeatedly hailed the killing of
Osama bin Laden as “justice” 11—entirely divorcing justice from any
form of due process. There was remarkably little public debate about
whether the Navy Seals who carried out the raid on bin Laden’s
hiding place in Pakistan had the option of capturing rather than
killing him. There was little public inquiry even regarding the
instructions they had actually received from the Obama White House.
Concern about international law, which happens to prohibit the
denial of quarter to an enemy willing to surrender, 12 almost vanished
from public debate.
It might be that public feeling against the perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks was still too heated for anyone to bother about
international law in that situation. But consider a different contrast,
that between the recourse to active war measures under Bush and
then under Obama.
The Bush Administration received intense criticism, at least in
some quarters, for launching the invasion of Iraq in 2003 without a
formal authorization from the UN Security Council. 13 The criticism
grew more intense when, months after the invasion, investigators still
could not discover WMDs in Iraq. That seemed to undermine the
main argument which the Bush Administration had advanced for the
war—that Iraq had failed to dismantle its weapons programs (or
failed to satisfy international inspectors that it had done so).

Possible legal justifications are reviewed in somewhat more detail in a
non-committal memo distributed (secretly) to members of Congress. See
Memorandum from Jennifer K. Elsea, Leg. Att’y, to Congress on Legal
Issues Related to the Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens Suspected of
Terrorist Activities (May 4, 2012), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/ crs/na tsec/target.pdf.
11.

See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on
Osama Bin Laden (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden.

12.

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining “willful killing” as a
“grave breach”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, art. 40, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting
“denial of quarter”); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
arts. 8(2)(b)(xii), 8(2)(e)(x), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (defining
policy “that no quarter will be given” as “a war crime”).

13.

See J. Patrick Kelly, The International Law of Force and the Fight
Against Terrorism, DEL. LAW., Summer 2003, at 18, 20.
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President Obama launched air strikes against Libya in the spring
of 2011. 14 He promised that U.S. intervention was only directed at
protecting civilians in Benghazi and would be over in days. 15 The
intervention went on for more than half a year, as its aim shifted from
protecting civilians to ensuring the success of rebel forces seeking the
overthrow of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi. 16 The Obama
14.

See Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya
Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A8.

15.

The President’s most extended public explanation came in a televised
“Address to the Nation on Libya,” delivered on March 28, 2011.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.white
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-spee
ch-libya#transcript. Among other things, President Obama said:
[T]he pledge that I made to the American people at the outset of
our military operations [was that] America’s role would be
limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that
we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the
operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies
and partners. Tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge. . . . Going
forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting
civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and
partners. . . . the United States will play a supporting role—
including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue
assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications.
Because of this transition to a broader, NATO-based coalition,
the risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to
American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly. . . . The task
that I assigned our forces—to protect the Libyan people from
immediate danger, and to establish a no-fly zone—carries with it
a U.N. mandate and international support. It’s also what the
Libyan opposition asked us to do. If we tried to overthrow
Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We would likely
have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that
mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air. The dangers
faced by our men and women in uniform would be far greater.
So would the costs and our share of the responsibility for what
comes next.
Id.

16.

See Libya and War Powers, Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong.
89 (2011) (opening statement of Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Senator from
Indiana). At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
June 28, 2011—three months after President Obama claimed military
operations would be handed off to NATO allies—ranking member
Richard Lugar pointed out that actual events had followed a different
pattern:
United States war planes have reportedly struck Libya air
defenses some 60 times since NATO assumed the lead role in the
Libya campaign. Predator drones reportedly have fired missiles
on some 30 occasions. Most significantly, the broader range of
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Administration might thus have been criticized for misleading the
public and still more for using misleading claims to conceal its larger
strategic agenda. But there was little fuss when earlier White House
claims about military intervention were invalidated by subsequent
events in the Obama era.
The contrast is all the more striking because President Bush did
at least seek and receive formal authorization from Congress to
undertake military intervention in Iraq. 17 President Obama insisted he
did not need such authorization and thus did not seek it and did not
receive it. 18 He was not much criticized, however, for abusing
presidential war powers.
And so with the aftermath in each country. President Bush was
subject to intense, ongoing criticism for allowing Iraq to fall into
chaotic violence after the toppling of Saddam. Some critics even
protested the supposed inadequacies of the Iraqi tribunal that tried
Saddam and sentenced him to death. 19 Obama received very little
criticism for allowing Libya to fall into violent chaos or allowing the
Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, to be killed in the field by
opposition guerrillas with considerably less due process than Saddam
received.
Americans heard very little about the chaos and violence in Libya
following the fall of Qaddafi, until the U.S. ambassador and other
Americans were slaughtered by a well-planned terrorist raid against
the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. 20 The
administration spent weeks misrepresenting the facts of what
happened, which did eventually (as truth seeped out) provoke much
criticism. 21 President Obama responded by insisting that those

airstrikes being carried out by other NATO forces depend on the
essential support functions provided by the United States.
Id.
17.

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.

18.

See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, Memorandum Opinion for
the Attorney General 5 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Authority to Use
Military Force in Libya], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. For criticism see Michael J.
Glennon, A Comment on Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV.
NAT’L SECURITY J. FORUM, Apr. 2011, at 1.

19.

See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael W. Hanna, Ceding the High
Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of
Saddam Hussein, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2007).

20.

Helene Cooper, U.S. Shifts Language on Assault in Benghazi, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at A8.

21.

For one effort to unravel the misrepresentations, see Benghazi Timeline,
FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2012/10/benghazi-timeline
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responsible for the attack would be “brought to justice.” 22 Almost no
one asked about how this would be done. Such legalistic inquiries
were out of fashion in the Obama era.
I believe the point could be extended through a number of other
contrasts but these examples are sufficient to establish the point. And
that point is broader than a protest against partisan hypocrisy. The
relevant point here is that standards for the conduct of security
policy, particularly outside the United States, are not easily contained
by legal standards. That does not mean that law has no place in
debates about foreign or security policy. But it does mean that law is
bound to be less reliably respected or less consistently applied in
international disputes.
Debates in the Bush era might have been less angry and
moralistic if this truth had been more widely acknowledged. Events in
the Obama era might have been viewed with more appropriate
skepticism if this truth had been remembered. Goldsmith’s account
encourages readers to imagine that we emerged from untrammeled
executive willfulness in President Bush’s first term into an era of
standards and constraints in later years. That was always unlikely.
It was unlikely for reasons illuminated by Goldsmith himself in
Law for States. That analysis does not appear in the new book, but it
sheds much light on the events described there and perhaps even
more on events that unfolded in Obama’s first term.

II. International Law Often Lives by Exceptions
The Goldsmith-Levinson article starts with the common
complaint that international law is not real law because it does not
have the requisite clarity and detail. 23 The authors acknowledge
various reasons. Notably, when treaty law or customary law is
ambiguous, there is no international legislature to offer new
provisions. International courts can rarely offer guidance, because
access to such courts is severely limited. The main theme of the
article is that quite comparable difficulties arise in domestic
/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2012). For another compendium of false claims,
see Michael Pearson, What Obama Administration Has Said About
Libya Attack, CNN (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012
/10/01/politics/libya-attack-statements/index.html.
22.

The president reaffirmed his determination to see perpetrators of the
Benghazi attack “brought to justice” in his second debate with Mitt
Romney. Critics interpreted the phrase as a threat to bring down more
drone strikes on suspects. Glenn Greenwald, U.S. Justice Likely Coming
Soon to Benghazi with Extrajudicial Executions, THE GUARDIAN (UK),
Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/19/
benghazi-attack-suspects-drones.

23.

See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1792–93.

87

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
War Without End?

constitutional law, since the Constitution is (like international
conventions) very hard to amend by formal process and many key
issues are not settled by courts.
Though Goldsmith and Levinson do not emphasize it, these
problems are particularly acute—in both international law and
domestic constitutional law—when it comes to security issues. It is in
this area where appeals to law most often seem to founder on the
difficulty of achieving agreement on what the law is or what it
requires. Trade treaties often include long supplements covering many
distinct issues in great detail. Major trade agreements, such as those
establishing NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, make
provision for compulsory arbitration of disputes, allowing the
accumulation of clarifying case law. 24 When it comes to security
issues, however, there is less treaty law and far less resort to
international tribunals. In this area, there are almost no provisions for
compulsory arbitration because states have rarely been willing to
entrust decisions about the use of force to international arbitration.
One consequence is that policies can be unavowed, even if they
are not (or cannot be) fully concealed. The White House allowed leaks
to reveal American involvement in cyberattacks on the Iranian
nuclear program but refused to provide any official clarification of the
underlying policy. 25 NATO assistance to anti-Qadaffi rebels in Libya
was handled in the same way. NATO’s initial intervention was
justified under a UN Security Council resolution authorizing
24.

The official text of the North American Free Trade Agreement, as
published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, runs 567 pages for
the main agreement, then includes a volume of “annexes” of roughly
equal size, followed by three more volumes, setting out the “tariff
schedules” provided by each of the three parties to the agreement.
North American Free Trade Agreement (G.P.O., 1992). The
Organization of American States might be considered the security
counterpart to NAFTA; the entire OAS Charter runs to less than
twenty-five pages in standard format and the provisions most relevant
to security—”Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and “Collective
Security”—run less than two pages. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, arts. 24–28. The World Trade Organization is
responsible for coordinating compliance with global trade agreements.
There are some sixty agreements in all, totaling some 550 pages. See
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,jhttp://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_.
htm. By contrast, the UN Charter, in a standard format, runs to less
than 25 pages. The provisions most directly relevant to security run less
than five pages. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 33–51.

25.

See Peter Beaumont & Nick Hopkins, U.S. Was ‘Key Player in CyberAttacks on Iran’s Nuclear Programme,’ THE GUARDIAN (UK), June 1,
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/obama-sped-upcyberattack-iran.
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protection for civilians. 26 Plainly, NATO ended up doing quite a bit
more than that. But it did not say that it was shifting to a new
policy. Nor did it bother to indicate whether it had changed its view
of what authorization might be needed for the wider intervention it
actually pursued.
It is easy in such cases to charge governments with concealing or
disguising their actual policies to avoid having to answer for them.
But it seems to me there is a wider problem. International law
depends a great deal on practical precedent—that is, real-world events
rather than judicial interpretations of them—since disputes are so
rarely brought before international tribunals, especially on security
related issues. It is even rarer that international tribunals are
recognized as establishing authoritative precedents. 27
So international law often relies on rough analogies, based on the
principle that what one nation may do, every other has the same right
to do. That in turn means that every time a nation acts in a
disputable way, it is in danger of establishing a dangerous precedent
in the hands of its enemies or its rivals. A court can say that its
decision should not be taken as a precedent—as the Supreme Court
actually did say in Bush v. Gore. 28 A foreign ministry cannot so
readily say the same. If it does, it has even less hope of getting others
to accept the claim.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) tried to square this circle
in the Nicaragua case: There is a customary law of armed conflict, the
ICJ found, even if it seems to be frequently violated. 29 Governments
confirm their support for that law when they claim their actions are
not covered or are distinguishable, rather than denying the existence
of any rules. 30 That may not convince skeptics that there is enough
law for an international tribunal to decide particular disputes based
on that law. 31 But as Goldsmith and Levinson note, there are many
domestic constitutional issues that remain comparably unsettled.
26.

See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).

27.

See U.S. Will Not Fully Recognize World Court Decisions, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 8, 1985, 3:54 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/
1985/US-Will-Not-Fully-Recognize-World-Court-Decisions/id-92a3c7ce6
dd927522b53b743f5cf466e.

28.

“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election process generally presents many
complexities.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).

29.

See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 92–97 (June 27).

30.

Id. at 98.

31.

See e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81
AM. J. INT’L. L. 101, 101−02 (1987) (criticizing the ICJ approach to
customary law in Nicaragua ruling for supposing that generalized
support for abstract norms can establish concrete customary practice).
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Take the question of when or to what extent the president can
deploy force abroad without a declaration of war. The Supreme Court
has treated this as a “political question” on which courts may not
rule. 32 The Court has explained that it must bow out of “political
questions,” that is, questions that do arise under the Constitution,
but on which courts cannot pronounce. These questions are said to
lack “judicially . . . manageable standards.” 33 If that is not a
tautology (there will not be judicial standards if courts decline to
craft any), it seems to imply that in questions like this, there cannot
be firm rules.
It does not follow that there is no law of any kind. Certainly, it
does not follow that there are no standards or criteria with that
element of moral authority we generally associate with law. Rather,
courts seem to fear that by pronouncing on such disputes, they might
endorse or overemphasize some criteria and then exclude or
marginalize others. What the political question doctrine does is keep a
range of arguments and considerations in play. Without involvement
from courts, we cycle through familiar arguments over and over.
Objections that fail to stop the president in one episode may still be
deployed, perhaps with more effect, in the next. In the right
circumstances, somewhat abstract legal arguments may have
considerable constraining force.
The Libyan intervention is an apt example. The Obama
Administration claimed, at the outset, that no congressional
authorization was required because U.S. involvement would be
minimal, the fighting would be very brief, and the purpose was to
assure respect for UN resolutions. 34 Subsequent developments belied
each of these claims. Is U.S. participation in the bombing of Libya,
then, a precedent for future presidents? Does it serve as a precedent
for humanitarian intervention, so long as there is some sort of UN
authorization? Or does it matter whether the Security Council has
actually authorized the scale of intervention that ultimately develops?
Does the presence of UN authorization of some kind mean the
president is free to act without any sort of authorization from
Congress? A president who assumes Libya is a clear precedent for
acting without Congress will likely discover otherwise, if his military
intervention results in significant U.S. casualties. The ambiguous
Libyan “precedent” of 2011 will not stop critics from invoking
32.

At least, when lower courts dismissed challenges to the legality of the
undeclared war in Vietnam, the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed
these rulings. See Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Velvel v.
Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002
(1968); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).

33.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

34.

See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 18, at 1.

90

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
War Without End?

constitutional limits when they protest a more costly or controversial
(and still congressionally unauthorized) intervention in future years.
The silence of Congress is no assurance of congressional support,
least of all for a subsequent venture. Congressional passivity preserves
political space for critics to raise objections in the future, since the
objections were not squarely addressed, and thus, never decisively
repudiated. Arguments left on the sidelines in 2011 may prove much
more effective against the next intervention, even if it seems
analogous to the pattern in Libya, if the new war proves more costly
or more unpopular. One can say the same about the United Nations,
which allowed expansion of the initial NATO mission to proceed
without formal rebuke. That does not mean the Security Council is on
record as approving the ultimate mission.
Justice Robert Jackson famously described the powers of the
president, in that area between explicit congressional authorization
and express congressional prohibition, as operating in a “zone of
twilight.” 35 It was a good metaphor, even before Rod Serling took it
up. What happens in twilight will be seen, at best, in a dim light. In
such light, observers may discern moving objects, but not see clearly
what they are. Mere shadows may be mistaken for actual objects.
What happens in twilight is likely to be interpreted differently by
different observers.
The absence of clarity threatens reliable application of rules. But
it helps to preserve general support for norms, despite disagreements
about their particular applications or their follow-on implications.
Commentators often speak of the “gravitational pull” of particular
rules or norms. It is another good metaphor. That is doubtless why it
gets invoked both in international law and in various fields of
constitutional law. 36 Advanced technologies have allowed us to
overcome the force of gravity when we want to do so. But it requires
a great deal of concentrated energy to launch a rocket or keep a jet
plane airborne, because gravity still has an effect. So, too, general
norms may exert continuing influence.
It might be that we cannot do much better when it comes to
many international policy choices. It might be that we are asking too
much when we suppose that law can be as constraining in
international affairs as track routes are for locomotives.

35.

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).

36.

See, e.g., Edward Swaine, Subsidiary and Self-Interest: Federalism at
the European Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 47 (2000)
(referring to the “gravitational pull” of particular European Court of
Justice doctrines in national courts).
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III. Political Crimes and the Gradations of Immunity
There is a similar pattern when it comes to personal
accountability—or its seeming converse, immunity. As Goldsmith
records in his book, human rights groups urged the Obama
Administration to prosecute Bush Administration officials for
violating fundamental international norms, particularly the
prohibitions against torture. 37 The Obama Administration made some
gestures in this direction, insisting that investigations of CIA officers
accused of torture must be reopened and reconsidered. 38 In the end,
however, the Obama Justice Department declined to pursue actual
prosecutions of any U.S.j officials involved in Bush-era interrogation
practices. Human rights advocates protested 39 but the protests were
disregarded by leaders in both political parties and so sank into
obscurity.
Accordingly, some human rights advocates have urged that, when
it comes to Bush-era abuses, justice and the international rule of law
should be vindicated by foreign courts or by international tribunals.40
But that remains quite unlikely. Here again, differing priorities get in
the way, and international law actually mirrors comparable gaps in
domestic law.
There is now an International Criminal Court (ICC), which has
been operating in The Hague since 2002. 41 Since the 1990s, a number
of states have claimed universal jurisdiction to prosecute the most
extreme human rights violators. 42 But there is still no actual
precedent for the prosecution of government officials from a major
power by an external jurisdiction. Legal institutions are in place that
might enable such a prosecution but it is surely not by mere chance
that no such case has yet been pursued.
The ICC has turned out to be a very weak institution, completing
only one prosecution in its first decade. 43 States can exempt
37.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 234–36.

38.

Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1.

39.

See id.

40.

See, e.g., Ex-Powell Aide: Dick Cheney Fears Prosecution for War
Crimes, NBC, Aug. 31, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44337
958/ns/us_news-security/#.URwdDaXAdjR.

41.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
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See Universal Jurisdiction, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org
/en/international-justice/issues/universal-jurisdiction (last visited Feb.
13, 2013).
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themselves from its jurisdiction—at least for potential crimes within
their own borders—if they simply decline to ratify the ICC treaty.44
Not only the United States, but Russia, China, India, Turkey, Brazil,
and dozens of others have declined to ratify. In principle, ratifying
states are pledged to extradite anyone indicted by the court that can
be found within their borders. 45 In practice, states have broad
discretion not to extradite, since the court has no means of penalizing
states that fail to cooperate. For the same reason, the court cannot
assure that witnesses will come forward or that necessary documents
are produced.
Meanwhile, the bulk of the court’s funding and public support
comes from major states in the European Union. 46 The court has no
means of forcing financial backers to continue their contributions. So
it would be especially awkward for the court to offend major
European states or their friends and allies.
There may still be cases where a weak government prefers to have
one of its own nationals prosecuted at The Hague. There may be
cases where a weak state has to accept prosecution of its own
nationals at the demand of other, stronger states. Such partial justice
may still be regarded as a form of justice. It remains true that the
court does not have the capacity to view all offenders impartially.
Establishing a fully international criminal court does not establish an
international authority, capable of forcing all states to yield to the
same law.
So it has proved with claims for universal jurisdiction. In
Belgium, Spain, and Germany over the past decade, suggestions that
prosecutors might pursue charges against top U.S. officials provoked
angry American protests, followed by changes to the universal
jurisdiction statutes to avoid such confrontations in the future. 47 As
13, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindia
nocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9141687/International-CriminalCourt-to-deliver-first-verdict-10-years-and-750-million-after-itopened.html.
44.
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between abstract commitment to universal justice and concrete
concerns for national security (such as preserving friendly relations
with a very powerful ally), states gave priority to the latter. Despite
the excitement stirred by the attempted prosecution of Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998, there has been no such
prosecution attempted since then. 48
Rather than dwelling on the weakness of international justice,
however, we might do better to remember that even national justice
systems are often quite forgiving of past abuses by government
officials. The United States waged war against Confederate rebels for
four years but prosecuted no Confederate leaders after the South’s
surrender. 49 In more recent times, opponents of apartheid in South
Africa waged a decades-long struggle for justice but accepted a
general amnesty of apartheid era officials (and terrorist attacks by
apartheid opponents) in order to achieve agreement on majority
rule. 50 The same happened in Chile and in eastern Europe in the
1990s; leaders preferred reconciliation and stability to strict justice, so
instead of prosecutions, there were amnesties. 51
Every organized legal system makes provision for amnesties and
individual pardons. There is no counterpart power at the international
level. I believe that is because the pardon power is understood to
reflect ultimate political judgments outside the normal limits of law.
National legal systems almost always entrust this power to the
executive, thus acknowledging that the executive is not simply bound
by law or bound by law in all decisions. To acknowledge such
authority on the international plane would be very difficult. It would
say, in this case, that above the states of the world, there is a
prosecutor who acts for humanity and he can judge on behalf of
humanity when justice is better served by pardoning crime than by

TIMES Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/world/ame
ricas /14iht-rumsfeld.3532840.html.
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punishing it. The world is not quite prepared to say that in public. So
there is no provision for a pardon power in the ICC Statute.
But international justice is not made stronger by concealing its
weak foundations. If we cannot trust prosecutors to make
authoritative decisions about pardon, we are, in effect, demanding
that they conceal their political assessments. The ICC’s first
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, claimed that he had no need to
worry about whether prosecution might provoke more violence by, for
example, undermining a transition agreement or a cease-fire
contingent on an amnesty. The prosecutor’s job, he insisted, was
simply to follow the law. 52 One may hope he was not being fully
honest. One can be sure that governments will not embrace such
legalism—disregarding the ensuing death toll so long as a prosecutor’s
notion of law and justice is served.
The point is not that the powerful must always escape justice.
But there is a cost to imposing justice. Saddam Hussein was finally
brought to justice. Even many human rights advocates seem to think
the cost of doing so was too high. 53 The costs are lower within a state
that has well-established law. Still, President Ford judged that a
52.

Questioned about the possibility that his attempt to prosecute the
Sudanese head of state would prolong war in Sudan, Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo explained that his responsibility was “judicial”—that
is, solely to the law: “I have no political responsibility,” he insisted.
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how it can be that efforts to “hold the legal limits” can never threaten
peace or why there would never be a trade-off between peace and
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prosecution of former President Nixon would be too politically
divisive to be in the country’s best interest. That assessment might
still be debated. It is debatable because people care about upholding
legal standards, but it is not the only thing they care about.

IV. Competing Philosophic Perspectives
Contemporary political debates stir passions. One might think the
ultimate stakes would be seen more clearly if viewed more abstractly.
In fact, the same difficulties appear in classic accounts of natural
justice from centuries ago.
Perhaps the most influential exponent of natural law, certainly for
the American Founders, was the 17th Century English philosopher,
John Locke. Prior to all positive laws enacted by governments,
according to Locke, mankind was (and still is) obligated to the law of
nature. That law “teaches all Mankind who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
Life, Liberty or Possessions.” 54 In Locke’s account, there is a standard
of justice in the state of nature. There can be private property by
mutual consent in the state of nature and agreement on precious
metals as a medium of exchange. 55 Separate nations, which remain in
a state of nature with each other, may establish borders by common
consent. 56 So in principle, it would seem disputes between nations
could be settled appeals to natural law.
Despite these promising premises however, Locke insists that
rights in the state of nature are “very unsafe, very unsecure.” 57 The
law of nature contains exceptions for self-protection: everyone is
bound by the law of nature “to preserve himself and . . . so by the
like reason, when his own Preservation comes not in competition,
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind.” 58 The
qualification giving preference to self-preservation allows for a natural
right to “do Justice on an Offender”—imposing punitive harm to
deter future attacks on the innocent. 59
The conflicts generated by such self-protective measures may
explain why rights remain insecure in the natural state, where there is
no “known and indifferent judge . . . to determine all differences
according to established law” and no “power to back and support the
54.
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sentence . . . and give it due execution.” 60 Agreements to establish
government make rights more secure for individual citizens, at least
when governments are bound by law. But when it comes to dealing
with foreigners, governments still must exercise a power that is not
quite subject to law:
[W]hat is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much
upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests,
must be left in great part to the Prudence of those who have
this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of
their skill, for advantage of the Commonwealth. 61

Locke ultimately acknowledges, however, that such discretion is
not unique to the management of foreign affairs. Locke advises that
the executive must also retain broad power to make exceptions to the
law, even in domestic affairs: there must be a “power to act according
to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of law and
sometimes even against it” because “it is impossible to foresee, and so
by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities that may concern
the publick; or to make such Laws, as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all
Persons. . . .” 62
The seeming contradictions are, after all, logical. If you think that
the ultimate purpose of law is to secure rights, it makes sense that the
law should give way to urgent claims about security (or even to
humanitarian exceptions to legal justice). 63
The same equivocation following the same logic appears in the
writings of Emer de Vattel, whose mid-eighteenth century treatise on
the law of nations, Le Droit des Gens (The Law of Nations), 64 had
enormous influence on the American Founders. The “first general law
. . . established by nature among all nations,” according to Vattel, “is
that each Nation should contribute as far as it can to the happiness
and advancement of other Nations,” but each nation’s “duties toward
itself clearly prevail over its duties toward others. . . .” 65 “The duty
which nature has imposed upon Nations, as upon individuals, of selfpreservation . . . would be to no effect if they had not at the same

60.

Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted).

61.

Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted).

62.

Id. at 375 (emphasis omitted).

63.

Hence, among other things, Locke makes explicit provision for a power
in the executive to pardon offenses against the law. Id. at 375.

64.

EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758).

65.

Id. at 6.

97

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
War Without End?

time the right to prevent any interference with its fulfillment.”66
What, then, if a nation is “threatened by the increasing strength of a
hostile power? . . . Will it be time to defend ourselves when we are no
longer able to?” 67 Vattel does not minimize the challenge: “Prudence
is a duty incumbent on all men, and particularly upon the rulers of
nations, who are appointed to watch over the welfare of an entire
people.” 68 Fortunately, wise statesmen can find ways to reconcile
prudence and legality: “There is perhaps no case in which a State has
received a notable increase of power without giving other States just
grounds of complaint.” 69
Such concessions to exigency may, of course, undermine respect
for law and principle. Appeals to law and principle, however, can go
beyond the point where most of us would be willing to follow. The
difficulty appears most clearly from the conclusions embraced by the
most principled philosophical advocate for this alternate view, the
Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant dismissed the leading
writers on international law (including Vattel) as “sorry apologists”
because they actually preached a doctrine which left international
obligation, hence, the hope of international cooperation and
international peace, contingent on each nation’s own calculations of
its own interests. 70 Kant preached the moral duty of law, as an end in
itself. Literally: any thought to particular benefits (or costs) adhering
to a universal law would, in Kant’s account, undermine the moral
authority of law as a duty. 71 So he denounced any sort of pardon
power as improper, since a pardon power would imply exceptions to
the moral force of law. 72 Kant also denounced revolution, even under
the most oppressive government, since revolution could never be
justified by a general principle without undermining the citizen’s duty
to obey the law. 73
In international affairs, Kant advocated a peace federation, which,
by guaranteeing security to every state, would make it unnecessary
for national governments to weigh their international duties against
66.
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their more immediate security concerns. As unlikely or impractical as
the scheme might seem, it did at least face the underlying issue: if
security is threatened, how can a government simply adhere to law
without regard to consequences? Kant made freedom the center of his
doctrine—the freedom to act morally by acting in accord with
universal principles, rather than distracting personal concerns. In his
essay on morality and politics, he embraced the maxim, Fiat iustitia,
pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)—that is,
justice at any price. 74 It is, in its own way, as logical as Locke’s
conclusion, once you accept Kant’s very different premise: if the point
of law is to demonstrate the moral freedom to obey a universal law,
you shouldn’t care about consequences to yourself or your fellow
citizens.
Not many people want to follow this logic, however. Demands for
adherence to law and principle are most convincing when the cost of
adherence is expected to be quite affordable. Unyielding commitment
to principle looks less attractive when it threatens to bring the sky
crashing down.

V. Conclusion
It does not follow that there are no standards for international
conduct, no norms even for normal times. But once we acknowledge
that there will be exceptions, we will argue about when and where
and how much—when we don’t forget about constraining rules
altogether (because the cost of non-compliance seems so small or the
cost of full compliance so unacceptable).
Jack Goldsmith ends his book by acknowledging that the United
States will eventually endure “another massive terror attack at home,
perhaps one as catastrophic as 9/11,” prompting “recriminations
against the presidency” and “recriminations against the accountability
system for the presidency,” followed by an accretion of new powers in
the executive and ultimately by a new round of complaints that
executive powers have been abused. 75 “And so the cycle will begin
again.” 76
I think Goldsmith is right about these predictions. But they come
at the very end of his book, without acknowledgment of how much
they call into question the general tenor of the preceding analysis. We
do not have strong reasons to congratulate ourselves on the
“accountability” mechanisms that restrained the Bush Administration
and then failed to impose much serious constraint on Obama. The
74.
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compromises reached in Bush’s second term may have been sensible
policy adjustments or little more than a reflection of the political
balance at the time. Very likely, we will view the developments of
recent years in a different perspective after the next great challenge to
our security.
We may have no better alternatives. But we should not conceal
from ourselves that the “law” surrounding national security policy
remains tenuous, disputed and malleable and is most often interpreted
by observers—both inside government and outside—driven by a range
of political concerns, which are sometimes quite partisan and shortsighted. If we are in for “war without end,” we must expect legal
wrangling to continue, wrangling that may be intermittent, but will
prove recurring and always, in the long term, indecisive.
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